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Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

On March 9, 1989, in Vienna, the 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact opened the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). On May 29, 1989, at the NATO summit, Allies announced their intention to accelerate the timetable for implementing a CFE agreement and expanded their proposals for the talks. President George Bush, during his trip to Europe for the NATO summit, underscored the desire of the United States and its Allies for a far-reaching agreement when he declared that "to significantly ease the burden of armed camps in Europe, we must be aggressive in our pursuit of solid, verifiable agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact."

The present concentration of military forces in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains is the highest ever known in peacetime and represents the greatest conventional forces destructive potential ever assembled. There has long been a substantial disparity in these forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact, i.e. more than 3 to 1 in tanks and artillery, and more than 5 to 1 in armored troop carriers, and it is these weapons, capable of rapid mobility and great firepower, which are central to seizing and holding territory. NATO has long held the position that the military forces of the Soviet Union and its allies are far in excess of what is required for defense. This disparity threatens stability and security in Europe.

The Eastern bloc now acknowledges that a substantial imbalance exists among certain categories of conventional forces of the two alliances. Warsaw Pact willingness to reduce these asymmetries was a major factor in enabling the two alliances to open the CFE negotiation.

The objectives of the CFE negotiation, as mutually agreed upon by the 16 members of NATO and the 7 members of the Warsaw Pact, are:

- The establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- The elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security;
- The elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

On the first day of the negotiation, NATO proposed a comprehensive package of measures and provisions. Warsaw Pact willingness to respond to NATO initiatives has significantly narrowed conceptual differences and has helped move the talks forward. The East's response to NATO's proposed regional sub-zone concept and its proposal on stationed forces and limits on holdings by individual countries, for example, helped further establish the common ground between the two alliances, as did the East's willingness to accept the West's proposed ceilings on main battle tanks and armored troop carriers. (Some of the issues remaining to be resolved include definitions of key equipment, especially artillery, aircraft and helicopters.)

On July 13, 1989, NATO tabled a revised CFE package. This package builds on NATO's original proposal and fully incorporates the essential elements of President Bush's CFE initiative, agreed to by all the Allies at the NATO summit in late May. In tabling the proposal, NATO advanced the negotiating process by providing details of its new conventional forces initiative two months ahead of NATO's own deadline. NATO's expanded CFE initiatives include these new elements:

- Lock in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western limits on tanks, armored troop carriers, and artillery pieces (depending on the resolution of questions about definitions);
- A requirement that reduced equipment be destroyed.
- Inclusion of limits on all land-based combat aircraft and helicopters in the Atlantic-to-the Urals (ATTU) zone at a level fifteen percent below the current NATO level;
- A proposed manpower ceiling of 275,000 each on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of their respective national territory in the ATTU zone. This manpower ceiling will result in the U.S. withdrawing 30,000 combat troops from Europe (a 20% cut in such troops) and require the Soviets to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe by about 325,000;
- An accelerated timetable for reaching and implementing a CFE agreement. The Allies would like to reach an agreement within six to twelve months, and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

As the CFE negotiation progresses, NATO will be guided by the following principles:

- No one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms.
- Addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will not by itself affect the stationing of armaments outside national borders; specific limits will be needed on forces stationed in other countries' territory.
- The need to focus on both the levels of armaments and state of readiness of forces in those areas where the concentration of such forces is greatest, as well as to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another.

Through the CFE negotiation, NATO seeks to establish a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible options. We pursue this aim on the basis of respect for the security interests of all. Our goal is a Europe whole and free, safe from the threat of domination by force.

A Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact CFE Proposals

(Definitions remain to be resolved for all categories)

PROPOSED OVERALL TOTAL OF NATO PLUS WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES

	NATO PROPOSAL	WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks	40,000	40,000
Artillery	33,000	48,000
Armored Troop Carriers	56,000	56,000
Combat Aircraft*	11,400	3,000
Combat Helicopters	3,800	3,400
Manpower	NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.	2,700,000

EQUAL NATO AND WARSAW PACT LIMITS IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS

	NATO PROPOSAL	WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks	20,000	20,000
Artillery	16,500	24,000
Armored Troop Carriers	28,000	28,000
Combat Aircraft*	5,700	1,500
Combat Helicopters	1,900	1,700
Manpower	NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.	1,350,000

* NATO's proposed ceiling refers to total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. The ceiling reflects a far broader definition of combat aircraft than that used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a ceiling for "strike" aircraft only.

No one country to retain more than a specified percent (NATO proposes 30%; Warsaw Pact 35-40%) of the overall limits (definitions remain to be resolved for all categories):

SUFFICIENCY RULE

	NATO PROPOSAL	WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks	12,000	14,000
Artillery	10,000	17,000
Armored Troop Carriers	16,800	18,000
Combat Aircraft	NATO has proposed a ceiling of 3,420 for holdings by individual members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact of permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. This figure reflects a broader definition of combat aircraft than that used by the Warsaw Pact which has proposed a ceiling of 1,200 for "strike" aircraft only.	
Combat Helicopters	1,140	1,350
Manpower	NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.	920,000

Each alliance may not station forces outside their national territory in excess of specified limits:

LIMITS ON FOREIGN STATIONED FORCES

	NATO PROPOSAL	WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks	3,200 (active units only)	4,500 (in active units and stored)
Artillery	1,700 (active units only)	4,000 (in active units and stored)
Armored Troop Carriers	6,000 (active units only)	7,500 (in active units and stored)
Combat Aircraft	N/A*	350 ("strike" aircraft only)
Combat Helicopters	N/A*	600
Manpower	275,000 (U.S. and Soviet ground/air forces only)	350,000

* Due to the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, NATO has not proposed ceilings of stationed equipment.

NATO SUB-ZONE PROPOSAL

On March 9, NATO proposed the following interlocking regional sub-ceilings for four geographic sub-regions to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another:

Categories	Zone 1 (includes Zones 2, 3 & 4)	Zone 2 [a] (includes Zones 3 & 4)	Zone 3 [a] (includes Zone 4)	Zone 4 [a]
Tanks	20,000	11,300	10,300	8,000
Artillery	16,500	9,000	7,600	4,500
Armored Troop Carriers	28,000 [b]	20,000	18,000	11,000
Combat Aircraft	5,700 [c]	N/A [d]	N/A [d]	N/A [d]
Combat Helicopters	1,900 [c]	N/A [d]	N/A [d]	N/A [d]
Manpower	— [e]	— [e]	— [e]	— [e]

[a] Active units only
[b] Of which no more than 12,000 would be Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles
[c] Land-based combat aircraft/helicopters
[d] Due to the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, NATO has not proposed regional sub-ceilings or ceilings of stationed equipment
[e] NATO proposed a stationed overall manpower limit of 275,000 each for the U.S. and USSR

WARSAW PACT SUB-ZONE PROPOSAL



In May, the Warsaw Pact proposed the following regional sub-ceilings for three geographic sub-regions:

Categories	Central Zone	Forward Zone (includes Central Zone)	Rear Zone
Tanks	8,700	16,000	4,000
Artillery	7,600	16,500	7,500
Armored Troop Carriers	14,500	20,500	7,500
Aircraft	420	1,100	400
Helicopters	800	1,300	400
Manpower	570,000	1,000,000	350,000

WARSAW PACT ALTERNATIVE SUB-ZONE PROPOSAL



On June 29, the Warsaw Pact tabled an alternative regional approach with sub-ceilings:

Categories	North	Center	South	Rear
Tanks	200	13,300	5,200	1,300
Artillery	1,000	11,500	8,500	3,000
Armored Troop Carriers	150	20,750	5,750	1,350
Aircraft	30	1,120	290	60
Helicopters	30	1,250	360	60
Manpower	20,000	910,000	270,000	150,000